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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
CHESTER G. VERNER AND WILLIAM G. HALL.
FROM CHESTER G. VERNER.
ACCOMPLICE.
Moynahan v. People, Colo. 167 Pac. 1175.
An "accomplice" includes in its meaning all persons who have been con-
cerned in the commission of a crime; hence in a prosecution for knowingly
buying stolen ores the thief, though his theft was disassociated from the offense
of knowingly buying ores with which accused was charged, is an accomplice
of *accused. Garrigues, J., dissenting.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY.
State v. Langford, Dela. 102 Atl. 63. Consent.
A wife in confiding her person to her husband does not consent to cruel
treatment or infectious diseases, and a husband, knowing that he had syphilis,
an infectious disease, and concealing the fact from his wife, communicates the
infection to her, is guilty of ar assault and battery; the intent to communicate
the disease being inferred from the actual result.
State V. Cancelno, Ore. 168 Pac.'721. Specific intent.
In shooting his automatic pistol at a retreating automobile filled with people,
one of whom was hit, defendant committed an assault with a dangerous weapon,
though he did not have the specific intent to injure the particular person wounded.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
*State v. Barela, N. Mex. 168 Pac. 545. Self-incrimination.
Evidence of the correspondence of tracks of defendants, made by them
under compulsion of the sheriff, with those found at the scene of the alleged
crime of arson and leading therefrom, and evidence of the fitting of the shoes
of defendants, taken from them by the sheriff, into tracks found at the scene
of the crime, is not inadmissible, as violative of the constitutional guaranty
against compulsory self-incrimination. The privilege protects a person- from
any disclosure sought by legal process against him as a witness. The fact that
evidence is the result of an unlawful search of seizure, or is obtained by force
or intimidation by private persons or officers, when not under sanction of
judicial process, ordinarily has no effect whatever upon its admissibility.
INFANTS.
State v. Vineyard, W. Va. 93 S. E. 1034. Capacity to commit -crime.
In an indictment for murder against an infant under fourteen years of age
it is not necessary to negative the presumption of incapacity of the defendant
to commit the crime charged against him.
But an instruction in such a case telling the jury that when the homicide is
proved it is presumptively murder in the second degree, and if the state would
elevate it to first degree murder the burden is upon it, and if the defendant
would reduce the degree of the offense the burden is on him, constitutes revers-
ible error. The law casts no such burden on an'infant under the age of fourteen
years, who is presumptively doli incapax.
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And it is error for the court in such a case to tell the jury that if the de-
fendant at the time of the homicide "had sufficient understanding as to know
that the commission of that offense was wrong," the same law was applicable
to him as to persons over the age of fourteen years. To convict an infant in
such case it is necessary to show also that he knew or understood the nature
and consequences of his act and showed design and malice in its execution.
LARCENY.
Ex parte Clark, Calif., D. C. A., 34 Dist., 167 Pac. 1143.
"The evidence taken before the magistrate discloses that the case involves
the oft-told story of a bucolic and guileless individual, who, while awaiting for a
train at the Sacramento railroad station to convey him to his home in a north-
ern town, after a brief sojourn in the central portion of the state, accommodat-
ingly handed over to a brace of oily-tongued strangers $120 of his available
cash, as a loan, after the latter had insidiously crept into and gained his con-
fidence and were suddenly awakened to a realization that the freightage on
certain freight, which they represented that one of them had previously put on
board of a freight train, had to be prepaid, and that they were without sufficient
funds to pay the bill, exhibiting to the aforesaid guileless gentleman, as evi-
dence of their 'good faith,' a document purporting to be a draft on an eastern
bank for a sum greatly in excess of the amount necessary for their purpose."
(Quoted from opinion of court.)
Held: Where confidence men procure money upon the pretext that it is a
loan, with the intent to steal the same, the crime is larceny, the owner of the
money not having parted with the title thereto.
PAROLE.
State v. Ausplund, Ore. 167 Pac. 1019. Discretion of court.
Under Laws 1911, p. 152, providing that, when any person who has not
previously been convicted of a felony shall be convicted of a felony or mis-
demeanor and sentence not to exceed 10 years' imprisonment in the penitentiary
shall have been pronounced, the court may, in its discretion, parole the defend-
ant under certain conditions, the matter is left entirely to the discretion of the
presiding judge, and there was no abuse or discretion in refusing to parole a
defendant given an indeterminate sentence of from 1 to 15 years for man-
slaughter committed in producing an abortion, though the jury included a recom-
mendation of leniency in their verdict, and though nine of them made affidavit
that they would not have agreed to the verdict if they had known .the court
would not parole defendant
SoDoMY.
Ex parte De Ford, Okla. 168 Pac. 58. Nature of offense.
Sec. 2444, Rev. Laws 1910, providing: "Any person who is guilty of the
detestable and abominable crime against nature, committed with mankind or
with a beast, is punishable," etc., includes copulation between human beings per
os as well as per annum.
Comer v. State, Ga. 94 S. E. 314. Nature of the offense under Georgia
statute.
Pen. Code, sec. 373, reads as follows: "Sodomy is the* carnal knowledge
and connection against the order of nature, by man with man, or in the same
unnatural manner with woman." In this section the words "the same unnatural
manner" refer to the words "against the order of nature" and should be so
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
construed. Sexual intercourse by the use of the sexual organ of the female
and the mouth and tongue of the male is as much "against the order of nature,"
and therefore as fully covered by the statute, as where the sexual intercourse
is consummated by the use of the sexual organ of the male and the mouth of
the female, or as where the unnatural connection is accomplished by the intro-
duction of the sexual organ of one male into the mouth of another male. It is
too narrow a construction to hold that the words "the same unnatural manner"
limit the connection against the order of nature to cases where the connection
is consummated in some -manner by the use of the sexual organ of the male.
Bloodworth, J., dissenting.
TRIAL.
State v. Comisford, Nev. 168 Pac. 287. Argument of counsel.
Remarks of prosecuting attorney in argument alluding to rumors being pre-
valent that the jury, because 'f personal association and friendships, would.not
have the courage to send accused to the penitentiary, were reversible error.
"The office of district attorney is one of great power and responsibility.
It may often happen that he is called upon to protect the rights of an accused
person from the possibility of a conviction based upon public sentiment rather
than the actual facts of the case. When a prosecuting officer seeks to take
advantage of public sentiment to gain an unjust conviction, or seeks to take
an unfair advantage in the introduction of evidence, or in any other respect,
he is failing in his duty as the state's representative."
People v. Billings, Calif. 168 Pac. 396. Argument of counsel.
In prosecution for murder by setting a bomb, it was not misconduct for
the district attorney to compare defendant's conduct while testifying to that of a
hyena, and describe it as the cowardliest and most disliked animal in the world.
Error assigned to the statement of the district attorney that "it was easy
to see why accused objected to the state's showing the nature of a previous
conviction," was waived by failure to assign it as misconduct in the trial court.
People v. De Angelli, Calif. 168 Pac. 699. Misconduct of Prosecutor.
In a trial for murder, the prosecutor's repeated statements that defendant
was able to testify without an interpreter, made to induce the court to change
its ruling that his testimony should be given through an interpreter, were not
prejudicial, especially in view of the fact that if such statements were made
without sufficient cause, and with an improper motive, it would operate more
to defendant's benefit than to his prejudice.
THEATRES AND SHOWS.
City of Seattle v. Sinythe, Wash., 166 Pac. 1150. Showing indecent pic-
ture which has been approved by censorship board.
Seattle ordinance, sec. 1, provides that it shall be unlawful for any per-
son to display "any picture of an obscene and .immoral nature or wherein
any scene of violence is shown or presented in a gruesome manner or detail
or in a revolting manner or which tends to corrupt morals," etc. Section 2
creates an advisory committee to aid in the prevention of violations of the
ordinance. Section 3 makes it unlawful to exhibit any picture not approved
b; the national board of censorship or by the advisory committee, provided for
by section 2. Held, that it constituted no defense to a prosecution under the
ordinance that the picture displayed had been approved by the advisory com-
mittee appointed under the ordinance if in fact the picture was of a char-
acter prohibited by the ordinance.
